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Abstract. Scientists, for the most part, want to get it right. However, the social structures that 
govern their work undermine that aim, and this leads to nonreplicable findings in many fields. 
Because the social structure of science is a decentralized system, it is difficult to intervene. In this 
article, I discuss how we might do so, focusing on self-corrective-labor schemes (i.e., ways of 
distributing replication efforts within the scientific community). First, I argue that we need to 
implement a scheme that makes replication work outcome independent, systematic, and 
sustainable. Second, I use these three criteria to evaluate extant proposals, which place the 
responsibility for replication on original researchers, consumers of their research, students, or 
many labs. Third, on the basis of a philosophical analysis of the reward system of science and the 
benefits of the division of cognitive labor, I propose a scheme that satisfies the criteria better: the 
professional scheme. This scheme has two main components. First, the scientific community is 
organized into two groups: discovery researchers, who produce new findings, and confirmation 
researchers, whose primary function is to do confirmation work (i.e., replication, reproduction, 
meta-analysis). Second, a distinct reward system is established for confirmation researchers so 
that their career advancement is separated from whether they obtain positive experimental results. 
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Self-correction in the social and behavioral sciences faces three major problems. The first 
problem is epistemic: We need independent replications. Without them, we cannot rule out 
systematic error and increase our confidence in published findings. The second problem is 
sociological: Replication failures often lead to stalemates. Because replication attempts are not 
standard practice, reports of failed replications are often perceived as hostile attacks. Original and 
replication researchers question each other’s qualifications and intentions instead of engaging in 
fruitful discussions about ideas. The third problem is economic: There are few material incentives 
to replicate studies. Despite the recent acknowledgment of the epistemic importance of 
replication, and despite changes in editorial policies in some journals, replication is still 
underrewarded second-class work relative to novel research. Can the social and behavioral 
sciences overcome these problems? 
Addressing these problems, I suggest, requires intervening on the social structure of science, a 
difficult task given that science is a decentralized system. 
Prominent intervention proposals range from multisite replication projects to educational 
replication exercises. Inspired by the philosophical literature on the division of cognitive labor 
(Kitcher, 1990; Strevens, 2003), I call these proposals self-corrective-labor schemes: 
specifications of roles, responsibilities, and communication protocols for scientific workers to 
organize their replication efforts. Philosophers think that modern science requires dividing 
cognitive labor (e.g., organizing scientists into different fields) because the complexity of modern 
science exceeds the cognitive capacities of individuals (Weisberg & Muldoon, 2009). Here I 
argue that, contrary to what we see in practice, scientific self-correction is also a process that 
requires such a division. Specifically, I present evaluation criteria that self-corrective-labor 
schemes should satisfy to solve the epistemic, sociological, and economic problems and thereby 
improve scientific self-correction. I then use these criteria to evaluate four schemes that have 
been proposed and defend a new proposal, which I call the professional scheme. This scheme 
divides the scientific community into two groups that operate under different incentive structures. 
One group focuses on producing new discoveries, and the other group supports the self-corrective 
process by doing primarily confirmatory research (i.e., replication, reproduction, meta-analysis, 
and theory criticism). Finally, I argue that one way of implementing the professional scheme is 
for stakeholders involved in the research process (from funding agencies to journals) to support 
confirmation-research tracks for professors at universities. 
Framing the replicability discussion in terms of evaluation criteria that a self-corrective-labor 
scheme should satisfy provides a better philosophical understanding of the requirements that 
modern science must meet to be self-corrective. Traditional philosophical theories regard science 
as self-corrective (Peirce, 1901/1958; Reichenbach, 1938), but they are not informative about 
current practice. In addition, given that implementing self-corrective-labor schemes involves 
important cultural and structural changes, and that there are multiple proposals on the market, we 
need criteria to compare them and assess their potential efficacy, and this discussion is a step in 
that direction. 
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I have two caveats about the scope of this article. First, in response to the replicability crisis, 
some authors have forcefully defended statistical reforms. For instance, some advocate for 
banning p values (Trafimow & Marks, 2015) or replacing them with Bayesian statistics. I touch 
on this debate only tangentially. Although it is important to refine procedures for statistical 
inference, these refinements will likely fall short in increasing replicability unless flawed research 
and publication practices are also changed. Statistical tools can help us detect publication bias 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009; Light & Pillemer, 1984; Simonsohn, Nelson, 
& Simmons, 2014; van Aert, Wicherts, & van Assen, 2016). They can also help us detect and 
prevent errors in reporting (Nuijten, Hartgerink, van Assen, Epskamp, & Wicherts, 2016). 
However, they are not meant to substitute for replication. 
The second caveat concerns the generalizability of my proposal. Many challenges to increasing 
replicability (e.g., defective incentive structures) are common to all research domains. However, 
there are likely no one-size-fits-all solutions. My proposal primarily concerns laboratory-based 
experimental social-science research with convenience samples (e.g., most of the research in 
social and cognitive psychology). Other kinds of research, for example, in developmental and 
clinical psychology, face additional challenges (Tackett et al., 2017), so my proposal would 
require further refinements to apply to them. At some points, I discuss such refinements, but only 
briefly. 
1. Criteria for Evaluating Self-Corrective-Labor Schemes 
What does it mean to say that science is self-corrective? A current approach to understanding this 
idea is based on the parameter-estimation view (Cumming, 2012; Schmidt, 1996), according to 
which the aim of scientific experimentation is to estimate the magnitude of parameters such as 
effect sizes and confidence intervals. In this view, a single experiment could in principle provide 
a valid estimation of, for example, an effect size. The problem is that we do not know that the 
estimate is valid because any single experiment could be subject to errors from a variety of 
sources. In theory, direct replications correct such errors in the long run. That is, as a series of 
replications of an experiment lengthens, the meta-analytic aggregation of their effect sizes should 
approach the true effect size (narrowing the confidence intervals). This is an attractive story. 
However, it is true only under highly idealized assumptions. First, this story fails in an 
environment with publication bias and systematic confirmation biases, and when scientists 
conduct low-power experiments (Button et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2008; Ioannidis, Munafò, Fusar-
Poli, Nosek, & David, 2014; Nuijten, van Assen, Veldkamp, & Wicherts, 2015; Romero, 2016). 
Second, given that the concept of direct replication is an ideal, approaching it in practice requires 
careful consideration of how to define the target effects and how to compare original and 
replication results (Brandt et al., 2014). Third, self-correction requires updating hypotheses and 
theories, in addition to estimating parameters accurately. Hence, repetition of previous 
experimental designs is insufficient. Researchers need to explore alternative designs (e.g., 
considering potential moderators, mediators, and alternative data analyses) and evaluate broader 
theoretical implications. 
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Consider a pessimistic illustration of a scheme that is still in place these days: A lab designs and 
conducts a series of experiments. The “unsuccessful” ones (i.e., those with results that are not 
statistically significant), some of which are direct replications of others, go into a private file 
drawer. The successful ones are selected and reported in a manuscript, along with an engaging 
post hoc narrative that connects them. The manuscript is published. Some time later, a second lab 
gets interested in the publication and aims to extend its findings. The researchers consider 
directly replicating one of the original experiments, but they hesitate because direct replication is 
not rewarded. They skip replication, persuaded by the various successes in the original research. 
Then, they design and conduct a series of conceptual replications. They select the successful 
ones, and the cycle repeats. 
Most researchers (we hope) agree that we should replace this scheme. Nobody is explicitly 
responsible for checking that findings are replicable. Under this scheme, science does not self-
correct. In this article, I present and compare five schemes that arguably do a better job. To make 
the comparison, I introduce three evaluation criteria that offer a principled way of assessing their 
theoretical self-corrective merits. 
1.1. Outcome-independence criterion: replication labor has to be outcome independent 
Would you trust a food company that says that their products are safe for human consumption 
and should not be subject to independent control by the Food and Drug Administration? Should 
we not treat scientific findings with as much care? Many fields have historically neglected 
independent replication. However, in light of the replication crisis, the need for it has become 
more apparent (Asendorpf et al., 2013; Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012; Tackett et al., 2017). 
What does “independent replication” mean in the context of social and behavioral science? Here I 
focus on the notion of outcome independence. Replications are outcome independent when the 
person conducting the replication research does not have a conflict of interest regarding the 
outcome of that research. That is, the researcher’s own goals, projects, and prestige do not depend 
on the truth or falsity of the finding, and therefore the researcher does not have a strong 
preference for a specific outcome. According to this notion, replications by original researchers 
are not outcome independent. Yet most replication work in psychology is conducted by original 
researchers. Makel et al. (2012) reported that if a study is replicated at all, 52.9% of the time the 
same research team that published the original report (or an overlapping team) conducts the 
replication. Moreover, such replication attempts are more likely to replicate the original findings 
than are replication attempts conducted by other teams (Makel et al., 2012). Notice, however, that 
a replication attempt by another team is not necessarily outcome independent. Even if the original 
and replication teams are distinct, the latter could have conflicting interests if they share 
theoretical commitments or academic genealogy with the former. 
The argument for outcome-independent replication research is that it is the most effective way of 
correcting (nonrandom) error and, at the same time, signaling to other researchers that the 
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literature can be trusted. More specifically, outcome-independent replication research corrects at 
least three types of error, as I discuss next. 
1.1.1. Error due to questionable research practices. 
A published (successful) study could have involved questionable research practices (QRPs; 
Bones, 2012; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012), p-hacking (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 
2011), or HARKing (hypothesizing after results are known; Kerr, 1998). Researchers may engage 
in QRPs and p-hacking when they strongly prefer specific outcomes. This can be the case both 
for an original experimenter who is strongly invested in establishing a finding and for a 
replication researcher who is invested in the falsity of a previous finding. If replication work is 
outcome independent, the researchers who conduct it are less likely to engage in these practices. 
This goal can be supported further with preregistration under the right conditions (see the 
discussion of preregistration later in this article). 
1.1.2. Error due to unconscious confirmation or disconfirmation biases. 
Even the most honest and careful scientist can fall prey to unconscious biases (Ioannidis et al., 
2014; Nuzzo, 2015). In the case of replication work, original researchers could be subject to 
unconscious confirmation biases when they attempt to replicate their own work, and other 
researchers could be subject to unconscious disconfirmation biases. Nonetheless, when other 
researchers replicate an experiment, they can identify potential sources of bias that original 
researchers did not consider. As an example, consider the case of John Bargh’s controversial 
priming experiment (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996), in which the dependent variable was 
walking speed after being presented with words related to the stereotype of elderly people. In the 
original experiment, time was measured manually with a chronometer. Two failed replications 
used infrared sensors instead (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Pashler, Harris, & 
Coburn, 2011). Although other factors could explain the discrepancy, the insightful decision to 
use infrared sensors neutralized potential confirmation biases. 
1.1.3. Error due to fraud. 
According to survey data, fraud (understood as conscious fabrication, falsification, or 
modification of data) is rare (Fanelli, 2009). In contrast, QRPs are much more prevalent, subtle, 
and therefore worrisome as a contributor to nonreplicable research findings. Nonetheless, if fraud 
is not detected by statistical or social means, the errors that it introduces would still be corrected 
by outcome-independent replication work. 
1.2. Systematicity criterion: replication labor has to be systematic 
Replication failures often lead to stalemates. The original researcher shouts “positive!” the 
replication researcher responds with “false positive!” and then the original researcher responds 
with “false false positive!” The problem is not so much that the researchers disagree. After all, 
cutting-edge science is full of disagreements. However, when replication work is not standard 
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practice, disagreements after replication failure are often unfruitful, as they tend to focus on 
epistemically irrelevant factors (e.g., the other person’s qualifications and alleged ill intent). In 
such cases, uncertainty about the truth of the finding persists in the community. 
When all we have is one experiment and one replication failure, both the original and the 
replication researchers often have good reasons to cast doubt on the other’s work. On the one 
hand, replication studies often use larger samples than original experiments. Moreover, if the 
replication study is properly powered and preregistered and the original experiment is not, then 
the former is likely more informative (Simonsohn, 2015). On the other hand, the original 
experimenter can sidestep the failure in several ways, for example, by attributing the failure to 
undiscovered moderators or lack of understanding about the mechanisms responsible for the 
phenomenon (Cesario, 2014). Another option is to suggest that the replication experiment was 
not executed correctly because the design is hard to export to other laboratories (Bissell, 2013). In 
response, the replication researcher can argue that science does not progress if finding an effect 
requires an incommunicable special touch. In more unfortunate, but common, scenarios, 
disagreement persists because the original experimenter questions the replication researcher’s 
motives and interprets the replication attempt as a personal attack.1 Under what conditions can 
these unfruitful disagreements be reduced? 
Consider a scenario in which replication work is systematic: The same finding has been subject 
to multiple replication attempts, as opposed to only one. Systematic replication helps to 
overcome stalemates in two ways. First, it increases the reliability of estimates. All other things 
being equal, one original experiment and one replication experiment make equal contributions to 
the estimate of a parameter.2 However, taken cumulatively, multiple replication experiments 
narrow confidence intervals. And more important, concerns about the three types of error just 
mentioned in connection with the outcome-independence criterion lose weight when it comes to 
systematic replication attempts because results of multiple replication experiments converge. 
Second, systematic replication research can reveal the effects of moderators. Moderating 
variables can lead original and replication experimenters to stalemates when both sides provide 
arguably reliable evidence. Systematic replication experiments can help us discover moderation 
effects by manipulating the values of potential moderators. 
Note, however, that replication research needs to be both systematic and outcome independent to 
reduce unfruitful disagreement. Systematic replication research alone is not sufficient for 
obtaining valid estimates. Also, independent but nonsystematic replication experiments may not 
produce reliable estimates. Consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, 10 independent scientists 
attempt to replicate an experiment, and they pool the results of their 10 experiments at the end. In 
the second scenario, one scientist attempts 10 direct replications of the experiment. For both 
scenarios, assume equal sample sizes, materials, experience, weather, and so forth. In the absence 
of nonstatistical error (e.g., due to QRPs or fraud), valid estimates would be produced in both 
scenarios. That is, the meta-analytic aggregation would approach the true value of the parameter 
in question. However, in the presence of a nonstatistical error, the second scenario would not lead 
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to a valid estimate (and a body of literature consisting of such experiments would misleadingly 
signal validity.) Because in practice we do not know whether reported results of individual 
experiments reflect such errors, the first scenario ought to be preferred. 
Note also that adequate power, although mandatory, does not confer the same benefits as 
systematic and outcome-independent replication work. Granted, all other things being equal, an 
experiment with a larger sample size produces a more reliable estimate than an experiment with a 
smaller sample size (i.e., the former yields a narrower confidence interval). Also, when p values 
determine publication, published experiments with small samples tend to overestimate effect 
sizes (Button et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2008)—and these overestimations could have been 
prevented with large samples. Nonetheless, a large sample alone does not ensure the validity of 
an estimate because it does not rule out QRPs, bias, and fraud. 
Why has systematic and outcome-independent replication work been neglected in psychology? 
We can partially understand why by comparing psychology with fields in which such work is 
more standard, such as medical research. Compared with false positives in psychological 
research, false positives in medical research tend to lead to higher downstream costs (e.g., human 
lives), so there is pressure to adopt stringent (and costly) confirmation standards. Additionally, 
given the need to compare alternative treatments, medical research has focused on estimating 
effect sizes accurately (which requires systematic replication work) more than psychological 
research has. Another potential explanation is that psychologists did not need systematic and 
outcome-independent replication research during the rise of experimental psychology, perhaps 
because, for years, they could detect many effects without it. 
1.3. Sustainability criterion: replication labor has to be sustainable 
Incentives for replication work are few (Koole & Lakens, 2012; Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012). 
Sociologists, philosophers, and economists characterize the reward system of science as 
following the priority rule (Merton, 1957; Stephan, 2012; Strevens, 2003): Scientists’ reward for 
their work is primarily the community’s acknowledgment of their being first to make novel 
discoveries. Currently, scientists establish their priority via peer-reviewed publications and 
receive credit when colleagues cite and use their work. Under this reward system, the goal of 
increasing the frequency of replication research faces an immediate theoretical problem: It is 
primarily novel science that is rewarded, and replication research is not novel. This threatens 
independent replication work. Additionally, under this reward system, credit is divided: As the 
number of scientists exploring one theoretical idea or methodological approach (broadly 
construed) increases, other scientists are discouraged from exploring the same idea or approach. 
This threatens systematic replication work. In short, replication labor is sustainable when there 
are incentives in place that make replication research a standard practice. 
In theory, the priority rule may provide incentives for replication work under certain conditions. 
A successful direct replication can be rewarded if the author supplements it with novel 
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information (e.g., meta-analyses or conceptual replications), or if the original design is 
“improved” (e.g., by adding controls). Arguably, however, once these modifications are 
introduced, the experiments look less like direct replications. For failed replications, the standards 
rise. Merely failing to obtain a statistically significant result does not merit publication. To claim 
novelty, the replication researcher has to make a convincing case that the original finding is a 
false positive (e.g., by using an enormous sample size and failing to detect the smallest effect that 
would be of interest). In such a case, the researcher can claim novelty for being the first to prove 
the original experimenter wrong. Notice, however, that this incentive is effective only when the 
target finding is well known. Hence, if this is the only incentive, very few findings will be 
checked. Also, this incentive is epistemically pernicious because it opens the door to 
disconfirmation biases. 
More precisely, changing the incentives to make replication labor sustainable requires solving 
two problems. The first is the venue problem—the problem that the publication system does not 
reward replication research. Proposals to change incentives have focused on this problem (see 
Nosek et al., 2012, for a discussion). The assumption is that if scientists have venues for 
publishing replication experiments (successful or not), they will attempt them more. Such venues 
have had moderate success. For example, public online archives of replication attempts, such as 
the PsychFileDrawer Web site, are excellent means for retaining valuable information, but given 
that they are not fully acknowledged as publication outlets, they provide few incentives, as 
evidenced by the relatively small number of reports that researchers have posted on them. Having 
journals dedicated to publishing replication research, such as the journal Replications in Social 
Psychology (Campbell & Jackson, 1979), has not worked either. The lesson is that the prestige of 
the venue matters. A more promising model to solve the venue problem is opening the doors for 
replication reports in prestigious journals (Cooper, 2016; Simons, Holcombe, & Spellman, 2014; 
Vazire, 2015). Moreover, journals and editors could even demand replication research. For 
instance, in response to low rates of successful replication of early published findings on 
genotype-phenotype associations, editors of high-profile journals adopted higher submission 
standards, including that manuscripts should report independent replication studies (“Freely 
Associating,” 1999; Kraft, Zeggini, & Ioannidis, 2009). 
Changing the incentives also requires solving a second problem: the career incentives problem. 
Imagine a world in which all prestigious journals change their policies and start publishing direct 
replication experiments but everything else remains the same. In such a world, what would be the 
career prospects of a scientist who does only replication work? Given the priority rule, those 
prospects would very likely be low. Hiring, grant, and promotion committees would still find 
novel research more valuable than replication research. The replication researcher’s work would 
still be considered second-class. In such a world, as in this one, at critical stages in scientists’ 
careers, it would be rational for them not to attempt replications and instead focus on doing novel 
work. Indeed, the rational strategy to get more publications would still be to conduct many 
exploratory studies with small samples as opposed to fewer carefully designed and adequately 
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powered studies (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012). The lesson is that changes in publication 
practices should be accompanied by changes in career incentives more broadly. 
The lack of replication attempts has concerned behavioral scientists for decades (Loevinger, 
1968; Smith, 1970). Still, replication has not become standard practice. History teaches us that 
the incentives have not been sustainable. Novelty still trumps replication, even if scientists 
understand the epistemic value of replication. A self-corrective-labor scheme has to align the 
incentives for conducting replication research with career incentives. Otherwise, the present 
worries about replicability will not generate sustainable changes. 
2. Evaluating the Self-Corrective-Labor Schemes 
A self-corrective scheme that satisfies the criteria in the previous section would protect the 
scientific community from individual biases, unfruitful disagreements, and incentive conflicts, 
and would create suitable conditions for the self-corrective process to work. But is there such a 
scheme? In this section, I first consider four prominent proposals (see Table 1 for a summary). 
The first scheme is the producer scheme. In this scheme, original researchers are required to 
replicate their work before publication (Cesario, 2014; Roediger, 2012). The second scheme is 
the consumer scheme, which requires researchers to conduct direct replications of findings they 
want to replicate conceptually (Pashler & Harris, 2012). The third scheme is the student scheme, 
which places the responsibility of replication labor on students in methods classes (Everett & 
Earp, 2015; Frank & Saxe, 2012; Standing, Grenier, Lane, Roberts, & Sykes, 2014). The fourth 
scheme is the multisite scheme, in which a group of labs identifies a target study, each lab 
attempts to replicate it, and a coordinating lab aggregates the data (Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et 
al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2012). I evaluate the merits of these schemes in light of 
the three criteria described in the previous section. However, I argue that they do not do justice to 
scientific self-correction and propose that the professional scheme (see Table 1) does a better job. 
At the end of this section, I discuss how preregistration might improve these five schemes and 
what the limits of such improvement are. 
2.1. Producer scheme 
Some authors (Cesario, 2014; Roediger, 2012) contend that one important source of low 
replicability of published findings, at least in social psychology, is that researchers are not critical 
enough about their own work. In Roediger’s (2012) words, if researchers “twisted, bent, and 
hammered” (p. 27) their own effects, they would find their own mistakes and would not pollute 
the literature with nonreplicable data. His lesson is to “replicate your own work prior to 
publication [and] don’t let others find out that you are wrong or that your work is tightly 
constrained by boundary conditions” (Roediger, 2012, p. 28). I call this way of working the 
producer scheme. In this scheme, replication labor is the original researcher’s responsibility. 
Once the researcher has collected data that shows a nonnegligible effect size, he or she executes 
the experiment again, more thoroughly, and can submit the work for publication only if the 
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experiment is successful again. In a sense, multistudy articles, which have been dominant in 
many subfields in psychology, implement this scheme.3 
Table 1. 
Characteristics of the Five Self-Corrective-Labor Schemes 
Scheme 
Parties in charge of the 
replication labor 
Criteriona 
Outcome 
independence 
Systematicity Sustainability 
Producer Researchers who 
originally obtained the 
finding 
  
Consumer Consumers of the finding   
Student Students in methods 
classes 
  
Multisite Groups of collaborating 
labs 
  
Professional A dedicated group of 
confirmation researchers  
  
aThe entries in these columns indicate which of the three criteria each scheme satisfies. 
 
This scheme can make replication labor systematic, but its biggest problem is that it does not 
make replication labor outcome independent. As an example, consider Daryl Bem’s (2011) 
controversial precognition article. Bem presented nine experiments in support of precognition. If 
we consider only direct replications, the experiment that other researchers have discussed the 
most (i.e., the one on retroactive facilitation of recall) was conducted successfully twice. And if 
we count conceptual replications, then Bem’s article presented nine replications of his finding. 
Here we have a scientist who worked under the producer scheme. Bem replicated his work prior 
to publication, multiple times and in different ways. Nonetheless, researchers still question his 
work (Rouder & Morey, 2011; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011), and 
the community at this point is far from accepting the finding. 
In general, replicating one’s work before publication could ensure more consistent estimates, but 
multiple replications by the same researcher can be subject to the same nonstatistical sources of 
error as the original study. Hence, it is expected that disagreements will persist. 
The producer scheme can satisfy the sustainability criterion if the editorial system enforces it, so 
that researchers who conduct their own replication experiments are not at a competitive 
disadvantage. Conducting additional replications increases the time to publication, but 
researchers can still claim priority after replicating results and publishing them. 
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2.2. Consumer scheme 
The consumer scheme places the responsibility of replication labor on consumers of findings 
(i.e., researchers who want to conduct research informed by an original experiment). This scheme 
is a response to the proliferation of conceptual replications and the striking lack of direct 
replications. According to Pashler and Harris (2012), “performing conceptual rather than direct 
replication attempts interacts insidiously with publication bias, opening the door to literatures that 
appear to confirm the reality of phenomena that in fact do not exist” (p. 531). That is, researchers 
trust other scientists too much and verify too little. The consumer scheme addresses this problem. 
A researcher who is interested in conceptually replicating a finding that another researcher has 
published should attempt to directly replicate it first. The slogan for this scheme is “no 
conceptual replication without direct replication.” Journals could implement this slogan as a 
nonnegotiable condition for publication. Thus, published articles with conceptual replications 
would always report a successful direct replication. 
This scheme constitutes an improvement in outcome independence over the producer scheme. 
First, it blocks the pernicious interaction between conceptual replications and publication bias. 
Second, researchers other than the original researchers conduct replications. Nonetheless, the 
consumer scheme does not fully satisfy outcome independence. A scientist who plans to 
conceptually replicate a finding has a conflict of interest regarding the replication’s outcome: He 
or she wants the required direct replication to succeed. 
Without changes to the publication system, this scheme partially satisfies the systematicity 
criterion. If the direct and conceptual replications both succeed, all the information becomes 
available, and this contributes to systematic replication. But if a replication fails, the consumer 
who attempted the replication does not try to publish a report on the failure, and this information 
loss affects other researchers. In particular, other consumers may attempt potentially useless 
direct and conceptual replications of the finding when they don’t know about its previous direct 
replication failures. Hence, at best, this scheme prevents propagation of errors but does not 
correct them, and it could even lead to bias. In a system that publishes everything, this scheme is 
more effective (van Assen, van Aert, Nuijten, & Wicherts, 2014). 
As is the case with the producer scheme, the consumer scheme can satisfy the sustainability 
criterion if the editorial system enforces it. Investigators who want to publish novel research have 
to pass the replication requirement, which incentivizes them to do replication work. 
2.3. Student scheme 
The student scheme makes students the main contributors to replication efforts (Everett & Earp, 
2015; Frank & Saxe, 2012; Standing et al., 2014). The general procedure is that as part of their 
training (e.g., in a research-methods class), students are required to attempt a replication of an 
assigned study. They conduct the experiment under the supervision of an experienced teacher and 
report the outcome publicly. Under this scheme, researchers learn about the importance of 
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replication early in their careers, and, in the meantime, many replication experiments are 
conducted. 
There are multiple possible implementation variants of this scheme (Standing et al., 2014). For 
instance, depending on the complexity of the target study, the students can be undergraduates or 
graduates. Different groups of students across different semesters can attempt to replicate the 
same target study, thus providing useful cumulative information (e.g., see Grahe et al., 2018). 
This could be a step toward satisfying the systematicity criterion. (Fully satisfying this criterion 
would require that professors or other students work on the aggregation of these results.) Students 
can report their findings in an online database, such as the PsychFileDrawer Web site. Publishing 
a replication study could be made a standard Ph.D. requirement in all accredited programs 
(Everett & Earp, 2015).4  
The student scheme can satisfy the outcome-independence criterion. For instance, to eliminate 
potential conflicts of interest, students should choose (or be assigned) to replicate a study that 
their own Ph.D. research does not build on, so that they are not hoping their replication attempts 
will succeed. This would make the student scheme superior to the consumer scheme. 
From the perspective of professional researchers, the student scheme is an appealing solution. 
But what about the students’ perspective? Trying to replicate other researchers’ work while 
working toward a Ph.D. requires an investment in time that puts the Ph.D. process at risk. As 
Spellman (2015) pointed out, sometimes students try and fail to do replications so many times 
that they do not have anything to show after a year of work. On top of that, they must worry 
about doing novel research. A solution is to treat replication work like mandatory military 
service, as Everett and Earp (2015) suggested. In their proposal, replication projects are a 
requirement in all accredited Ph.D. programs. If every student incurs the same costs, no student is 
at a competitive disadvantage. Thus, the student scheme can satisfy the sustainability criterion. 
One concern about the student scheme is that students (especially undergraduates) could lack the 
training necessary to perform certain experiments (Dijksterhuis, 2013). I think this should not be 
as great a worry in experimental psychology as it could be in basic research in the life sciences 
(e.g., wet laboratory research involving animal models.) And Standing et al. (2014) reported not 
having this problem in their experience. Nonetheless, the fact that this concern has been raised 
has a sociological moral. Typically, disagreements after replication failure involve professional 
scientists. And even when the original researchers and replication researchers have similar 
seniority, original researchers tend to question the abilities of replication researchers and not 
acknowledge the results. An original researcher may have the same or even a worse reaction 
when facing a failure to replicate by a student. If the replication fails, the original researcher 
could complain about the student’s alleged lack of expertise. To address this issue, the student 
scheme could incorporate multisite replication. This would require the right sort of coordination 
by teachers, but could reduce worries about a single student’s lack of expertise. Nonetheless, this 
approach would not solve unfruitful disagreement completely, and would still be very taxing for 
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students. The root of the worries concerning the student scheme, is that in this scheme, 
replication is still regarded as second-class work. 
2.4. Multisite scheme 
In the multisite scheme, rather than conducting isolated replication attempts, researchers at 
various sites coordinate their efforts to attempt independent replications of the same finding. 
First, a coordinating site identifies the target study. Next, each participating site conducts a 
replication, from data collection to analysis, and the labs then pool their results and report a joint 
analysis. Some Many Labs replication projects have implemented this scheme (Ebersole et al., 
2016; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2012) and have provided insights about the 
robustness of some findings. For instance, the 36 labs that participated in the 2012 Many Labs 
project (Klein et al., 2014) attempted to replicate four classic anchoring experiments (Jacowitz & 
Kahneman, 1995). Their aggregated results showed very large effect sizes (ds  2) for the four 
experiments and confirmed that anchoring is one of the most reliable effects ever discovered in 
psychology. The same project, however, failed to replicate a flag-priming effect and a currency-
priming effect. 
The main virtue of the multisite scheme is that it necessarily makes replication work systematic, 
which is useful to overcome unfruitful disputes. For example, contrast the reactions of the authors 
whose priming findings failed to be replicated in Klein et al.’s (2014) project with the stalemates 
discussed earlier. Yong (2013) reported that “Travis Carter . . . , who led the original flag-priming 
study, says that he is disappointed but trusts [the Many Labs] team wholeheartedly” (para. 10), 
and that “Eugene Caruso . . . , who led the original currency-priming study says, ‘We should use 
this lack of replication to update our beliefs about the reliability and generalizability of this 
effect’” (para. 10). Although personality differences could explain these differences in reactions, 
it is also possible that heated, negative reactions are more likely when original researchers face a 
single failure to replicate their findings rather than a multisite failure. Additionally, given that 
multiple labs often operate in different contexts (e.g., they can obtain samples from different 
populations), the multisite scheme offers not only more accurate estimation of an effect but also 
information about its heterogeneity and therefore its generalizability. 
A limitation of this scheme is that it may not satisfy outcome independence well. If participating 
labs are self-selected, they may have a special interest in seeing the findings replicated (or not). 
This limitation can be addressed by preregistering the study, requiring participating labs to join 
the replication project before the coordinating site discloses the target experiment, and assigning 
labs to experiments randomly if there are multiple target experiments. If these steps are taken, 
this scheme would do a better job at producing an unbiased consensus. 
A more serious challenge for the multisite scheme concerns the sustainability criterion. The 2012 
Many Labs report (Klein et al., 2014) has 51 authors. Under the current reward system, in which 
prestige is at best divided among participants in a project (and is preponderantly attributed to the 
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first author), engaging in this kind of projects is not profitable in the long term. These days, 
replication is a hot topic. But for how long will this be the case? We can make a theoretical 
prediction. Ironic as it seems, multisite replication projects are not outside the priority rule. 
Currently, it is appealing for scientists to invest some of their time in replication projects because 
such projects are novel. But the priority rule implies that once the hype about such projects 
passes, scientists will have significantly fewer incentives to engage in them. For this situation to 
change, the community needs to implement further structural changes.5 
2.5. Professional scheme: satisfying the criteria 
The professional scheme is my proposed self-corrective-labor scheme. It has two main features. 
First, there is a division of cognitive labor according to the stages of the research process. Today 
we accept that scientific communities thrive if scientists specialize and organize their work in 
structured institutions. Francis Bacon, a central theorist in the development of the experimental 
method in the 17th century, was perhaps the earliest advocate of this idea. Present-day scientific 
institutions divide cognitive labor primarily by discipline: Most scientists specialize in (and 
contribute to) clearly separated fields. But cognitive labor could be divided further, 
institutionalizing scientists’ specialization in steps in the research process. Indeed, Bacon’s New 
Atlantis (1627/2000) novel illustrates this kind of division. The novel describes a utopian 
scientific society that aims at expanding human knowledge and to do so breaks the research 
process down into tasks and assigns them to different groups. For instance, some workers (called 
“Merchants of Light”) collect facts, others (called “Pioneers” or “Miners”) design experiments, 
others (called “Inoculators”) execute the experiments and report findings, and still others (called 
“Interpreters of Nature”) generalize the findings.6 
The professional scheme adopts this kind of division. Researchers in the community are divided 
into two groups that specialize in different steps of the research process. For one group, discovery 
researchers, the main responsibility is to produce new discoveries. For the other group, 
confirmation researchers, the main responsibility is to support the self-corrective process of the 
community. This support involves primarily doing replication work (conducting direct 
replications and close replications that vary moderators and explore mediators, incorporate 
stricter controls, and test effects cross-culturally), but also conducting reproduction work (e.g., 
reanalyzing data, verifying hypotheses over existing data sets, conducting alternative statistical 
analyses), performing meta-analyses, and critiquing theory. 
Methodologists and philosophers of science distinguish between exploratory and confirmatory 
research.7 Hence, it is worth clarifying how these terms relate to the professional scheme. 
Exploratory research can be defined as research that looks for patterns (which might help to 
generate new hypotheses), whereas confirmatory research is research that tests predefined 
hypotheses or models. Although there are clear cases of each kind of research, there is also 
research that has both exploratory and confirmatory aspects (Wright, 2017). The point of the 
professional scheme is not to constrain discovery researchers to do only exploratory research. 
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They may well engage in confirmatory research, and to projects in between. Rather, the 
professional scheme is a system in which some scientists’ responsibility is to adopt a purely 
confirmatory mode about other scientists’ published work for error-control purposes. For 
instance, a project that has both exploratory and confirmatory aims for a discovery researcher can 
be later approached by a confirmation researcher from a confirmatory mode. 
The second feature of the professional scheme is that it institutionalizes the division of labor 
because the two groups operate under different incentive structures. On the one hand, discovery 
researchers operate under the novelty-based economy that governs science in academia. Their 
goal is to produce new knowledge, their professional career depends mostly on the prestige they 
obtain, and any financial reward is derived from that prestige. On the other hand, confirmation 
researchers work under a service-based economy: They are compensated for the quality of their 
confirmation efforts, and their goal is not to get credit by publishing new discoveries. 
The professional scheme builds on the insights of the other four schemes and addresses their 
failures. Unlike the previous schemes, the professional scheme fully satisfies the outcome-
independence and sustainability criteria. Sustainability is achieved by having distinct reward 
systems that support the division of labor. Confirmation researchers’ service-based reward 
system incentivizes them to engage consistently in replication efforts. Note that both the division 
of labor and the separation of reward systems are necessary. If the reward systems for the two 
groups of researchers were the same, then the demands for novelty would trump replication work 
when competition is high, as occurs in current practice. Establishing separate reward systems sets 
clear expectations for both kinds of workers and breaks the pernicious association between 
novelty and career opportunities for confirmation researchers. 
The professional scheme fully satisfies outcome independence because confirmation researchers’ 
incentives are completely disconnected from the outcomes of their studies. Their rewards and 
career advancement depend on how good and efficient they are at confirmation tasks and not on 
devising novel phenomena. Hence, they do not need to be invested in the success of any 
theoretical agenda. 
To satisfy systematicity, the professional scheme can adopt the procedures of the multisite 
scheme. (The professional scheme does not entail that replication research is systematic, but 
systematic replication is nonetheless necessary for the self-corrective process to work.) That is, 
confirmation researchers can coordinate replication projects, identifying target findings and 
recruiting other confirmation researchers to attempt the replications, pool their results, and report 
them. 
Before discussing how to implement the professional scheme, I discuss how incorporation of 
preregistration can refine each of the five schemes. 
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2.6. Refinements: study registration 
Psychologists have been increasingly interested in preregistration (i.e., uploading a time-stamped, 
noneditable plan for data collection and analysis to a public platform before conducting a study) 
and other open-science practices as interventions to increase the replicability of results. The self-
corrective-labor schemes I have discussed can incorporate preregistration. In this section, I 
discuss how doing so improves the original schemes, as well as the limitations that remain. 
One important general concern about preregistration and open-science practices centers on their 
range of applicability. These interventions require refinements if they are to be as effective 
outside the domain of hypothesis-testing studies involving easy-to-collect data as they are within 
that domain. In research with hard-to-collect data (e.g., in clinical or forensic psychology), 
necessary changes to sampling procedures are often unforeseeable (Tackett et al., 2017). 
Moreover, in longitudinal research (e.g., in developmental psychology), preregistered hypotheses 
and analysis plans may become obsolete because new findings or analysis tools may appear 
during data collection. In such cases, sticking to preregistered plans is not useful. We need more 
work to understand how different midway updates to experimental designs affect the epistemic 
import of studies (e.g., we need to better categorize kinds of research along the exploratory-
confirmatory continuum), and we also need more practical guidelines for registration procedures 
that are tailored to the research domain. 
But let us assume for the sake of the argument that authors preregister their plans correctly and 
rigorously. In this case, the primary virtue of preregistration is that it reduces error because it 
reduces the degrees of freedom that researchers have at different stages in a research project, 
from devising hypotheses to reporting results (see Wicherts et al., 2016, for a comprehensive 
categorization.) For this reason, if discovery researchers use preregistration, then the replicability 
of their findings would increase from the very beginning. Also, preregistration would benefit all 
schemes, because correcting errors arising from degrees of freedom is one of the goals of the 
outcome-independence criterion. 
Nonetheless, in the producer and consumer schemes, preregistration does not fully achieve 
outcome independence because it does not entirely correct errors arising from unconscious 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory biases, and it does not prevent or correct errors due to fraud. 
First, although preregistering the experimental protocol for a replication study means that the 
protocol is fixed, aspects of the execution of the experiment could still be flawed or remain 
(unconsciously) underspecified, which would allow biases to creep in. For example, think of 
Bargh et al.’s (1996) elderly-priming study again. Assume that the procedure for measuring time 
(i.e., an experimenter with a chronometer) was decisive for the experiment’s initial success. If so, 
a hypothetical preregistered replication by the same authors before publication would have likely 
stated the methods in the same way, and the results could have been the same. Additionally, even 
with preregistration, replications in the producer and consumer schemes can be subject to 
“hypothesis myopia” (Nuzzo, 2015, p. 183); that is, the researcher may focus on collecting 
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evidence that supports the hypothesis without considering alternatives. In other words, 
preregistration in these schemes guarantees that replication researchers follow the recipe, but not 
that the recipe is good. 
Second, even with preregistration, researchers can commit fraud. Granted, fraud is the least 
worrisome contributor to the replicability crisis. However, if we want to prevent and correct 
errors introduced by fraud and thereby increase trustworthiness of the published record, the 
producer and consumer schemes, even with preregistration, are less suitable than schemes that 
incorporate independent researchers. Indeed, mandatory preregistration could incentivize 
preregistration fraud, such as preregistering a study after looking at the data while collecting it or 
fabricating data that fit preregistered hypotheses. 
Preregistration would do a better job in improving outcome independence when experimenters 
are not invested in specific outcomes, that is, in the student scheme (when students’ own research 
does not depend on their replication project), the multisite scheme (when the assignment of labs 
to experiments is blind and random to avoid self-selection), and the professional scheme. 
Regarding the systematicity and sustainability criteria, all other things being equal, 
preregistration does not improve any scheme. Indeed, preregistration introduces a new worry 
regarding sustainability. Preregistration requires additional work, so encouraging it without 
changing the reward system puts the researcher who preregisters studies at a competitive 
disadvantage: Others may avoid the extra work with no penalty. Currently, some journals create 
an incentive by using badges (i.e., icons that recognize good practices) for articles that report 
preregistered studies. This is a small bonus. But one could hope that, with enough cultural 
change, badges would create an indirect incentive: If all your colleagues publish articles that have 
preregistration badges, then you will have to preregister your experiments too. Otherwise, your 
articles will look bad. 
Additionally, preregistration does not imply any course of action after study completion. Hence, 
if the researcher is highly invested in a positive result and the results are negative, then there is 
still a chance of information loss, which hinders self-correction in the long run. In an ideal world, 
the researcher in this situation would write up and share (and perhaps try to publish) a 
postreplication report. However, both in theory and in practice, preregistration does not 
incentivize reporting, nor does it penalize not reporting. For instance, results of at least 33% of 
registered clinical trials are not reported after the studies’ completion (Chen et al., 2016). 
A refinement that addresses some of the limitations of preregistration is to connect it to the 
publication system. The Registered Reports publication model (Chambers, 2013) provides such a 
connection. In this model, the researcher submits a research proposal (including experimental 
design and analysis plan) to a journal before data collection, the editors and reviewers evaluate it, 
and if it is methodologically sound (or revised so that it becomes sound), they give it an in-
principle acceptance. This means that if the researcher executes the proposed experiment 
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correctly, then the report will be published regardless of the experimental outcome. This model 
rewards good methodology and makes expected outcomes less relevant and therefore less 
pernicious as an incentive. Also, given that accepted proposals incorporate critical editorial 
feedback, this model can further constrain researcher degrees of freedom in comparison with 
plain preregistration and reduce hypothesis myopia. The Registered Replication Reports model 
(Simons et al., 2014) combines this publication model with multisite work. 
Schemes that incorporate Registered Reports would be better for controlling bias compared with 
schemes that incorporate only preregistration. However, they would not satisfy outcome 
independence when experimenters are self-selected because the experimenters would still 
conduct the experiments for which they have confirmation or disconfirmation interests and 
therefore could still make (unconscious) decisions that would bias the literature. In particular, an 
in-principle acceptance does not imply that the researcher will submit the final results to the 
journal. If the results are not consistent with the researcher’s broader career interests, the 
researcher may withdraw the study and not submit the report for publication. 
Finally, the success of preregistration with regard to sustainability is partial. If many prestigious 
journals require (and not merely allow) Registered Reports, then confirmation researchers would 
not have to worry about the venue problem. However, the career incentives problem would 
remain (see the earlier discussion of the student scheme). 
In short, preregistration, when done correctly, reduces QRPs but does not imply good designs, 
nor does it guarantee reporting, and the decision not to report can introduce biases in the 
literature. Registered Reports do a better job addressing these problems: Designs reflect editors’ 
and reviewers’ feedback, and in-principle acceptances remove the dependence between outcome 
and publication. This model contributes to approaching outcome independence, although there is 
still the possibility of error due to self-selection (which may introduce biases) and fraud. These 
and additional limitations concerning the systematicity and sustainability criteria can be 
addressed if Registered Reports are incorporated in the right schemes. Schemes that remove self-
selection (i.e., the student and multisite schemes with random assignment to studies and the 
professional scheme) would come closer to meeting the criterion of outcome independence. 
Schemes that incorporate multisite work (i.e., the multisite scheme and the professional scheme) 
would guarantee generalizability across labs. And schemes that address the career incentives 
problem (i.e., the professional scheme) would ensure sustainability. 
3. How to Implement the Professional Scheme 
The previous section established a theoretical ideal. The professional scheme separates reward 
systems for novel and confirmation research to solve the career incentives problem and make 
replication labor sustainable. At this point, the problems of the philosopher end, but those of the 
science policymaker begin. It is possible to imagine different approaches for implementing this 
scheme in practice. In this section, I discuss one of these approaches: establishing a system that 
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supports confirmation-research-track positions for professors at universities. To create such a 
system, it is necessary to align interventions at the levels of different stakeholders involved in the 
research process (see Table 2 for a summary). 
Table 2. 
Implementing the Professional Scheme: Interventions for Each Level of Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Intervention 
Universities and departments Create confirmation-research-track positions for 
professors  
Tailor tenure and promotion guidelines to 
acknowledge replication research 
Governmental and private funders Allocate steady funding for confirmation research 
Require multisite work for confirmation projects 
Standardize guidelines for evaluating 
confirmation-research proposals  
Journals and editors  Publish multisite Registered Reports 
Publish reproducibility reports  
Professional societies  Identify what is worth replicating in each subfield 
Define subfield-specific confirmation guidelines 
 
3.1. Universities and departments 
3.1.1. Create confirmation-research-track positions for professors. 
Currently, the responsibilities of university professors in most fields lie along a research-teaching 
spectrum: There are pure research and pure teaching positions and many hybrid research-teaching 
positions in which time is allocated to each activity depending on the university’s focus. To 
implement the professional scheme, I propose that departments segment the type of research 
expected from professors, creating (or allowing) positions in which confirmation research for 
error-control purposes is the main responsibility. 
Scientists in these positions should have a variety of experimental and analytic skills. On the 
experimental side, confirmation researchers should be skillful at identifying confounds, assessing 
the generalizability of findings, and optimizing existing experimental protocols creatively. On the 
analytic side, confirmation researchers should be versed in alternative tools for statistical analysis 
to evaluate the reproducibility of findings, as well as meta-analytic tools to assess bodies of 
evidence more comprehensively. Additionally, given that replication work is resource intensive, 
confirmation researchers should be skillful at creating and sustaining effective collaborations to 
share resources with other confirmation labs. (This is particularly necessary for subfields that use 
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hard-to-collect data.) Such collaborations could involve students to make multisite work more 
resource efficient (keeping in mind the caveats of the student scheme discussed earlier). For 
example, when the difficulties of a study involve design more than execution (e.g., survey 
research and online experiments), a confirmation researcher could coordinate students to execute 
the study. Similarly, Ph.D. students in scientist-practitioner programs could contribute to the 
confirmation of findings that inform practitioners in their subfield. 
This profile of necessary skills should be further adjusted according to the confirmation tasks that 
would be most useful for a given subfield. In subfields that rely on secondary data analysis (e.g., 
developmental psychology), confirmation researchers would need creativity to, for example, find 
alternative data sets and would need to be skillful at running different types of models on 
published data. 
What would make confirmation researchers and discovery researchers different is not 
fundamentally their skills, however. The two groups would need similar training in Ph.D. 
programs. Indeed, ideally, there would be substantial overlap in the skill sets of the groups. 
Confirmation researchers would need to produce creative work, and discovery researchers would 
need to improve their experimental rigor. 
Fundamentally, two factors would make the work of confirmation researchers and discovery 
researchers different. First, each type of scientist would have a distinct interest when approaching 
a finding. Discovery researchers would be after theoretical innovation, which may come at the 
expense of reliability. On the other hand, confirmation researchers would be primarily after 
findings’ reliability, but would remain neutral about how innovative a finding is. The interests of 
the two groups would be distinct because they would derive from different reward systems. 
Second, and more important, the two groups would work with findings that are different in 
origin. Discovery researchers would be concerned about producing their own findings (although 
this would not exclude the possibility that they could engage in confirmation work). 
Confirmation researchers, on the other hand, would work primarily with other people’s findings. 
One could worry about the costs involved in establishing confirmation-research tracks, as this 
would require creating a new infrastructure and new administrative procedures at universities. 
And one could wonder why it is not sufficient to just fund confirmatory research more, so that 
researchers have incentives to do it? Although it is indeed indispensable to create funding 
structures to support confirmation research (as I explain later), such an intervention falls short in 
meeting the sustainability criterion. Making funds for confirmation research available and 
accessible would still leave confirmation efforts as an option. If no one is explicitly responsible 
for confirmation work, it could be neglected—and this is particularly likely if scientists are 
strongly required to produce novel research. On the other hand, establishing confirmation-
research tracks would create clear expectations for conducting such work: For confirmation 
research scientists, confirmation would be not an option but a requirement. 
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A confirmation-research track could be of either of two types. In a pure confirmation-research 
track, all of a scientist’s research time would be devoted to confirmation work. Less radically, in 
a hybrid track researchers would allocate a fraction of their time to confirmation efforts and the 
rest to exploratory research. 
Pure confirmation-research positions would satisfy the outcome-independence criterion better 
than hybrid positions. Hybrid positions would not remove conflicting interests as well as pure 
positions because scientists in the former would operate simultaneously under two reward 
systems. These hybrid positions, however, would have a sociological advantage because they 
would not be perceived as making such a radical departure from the current system. Hence, 
hybrid positions could be useful during a transition period toward pure positions. 
How feasible would it be to create confirmation-research tracks? Universities already allocate 
professors’ time to different tasks (i.e., research, teaching, and administration). However, there 
have not yet been initiatives to create confirmation-research tracks for professors. One related 
precedent is that principal investigators have created positions in which Ph.D. candidates are 
primarily expected to carry out confirmation research.8 Students trained in these positions would 
have the right profile to become professional confirmation researchers after graduation. Although 
this initiative may not become standard, it illustrates the possibility of a system in which some 
scientists are primarily dedicated to confirmation efforts. 
3.1.2. Tailor tenure and promotion guidelines to acknowledge replication research. 
Tenure and promotion requirements in psychology departments typically include criteria such as 
productivity, visibility, and originality. The criterion of originality as traditionally understood, of 
course, should be given less weight for confirmation researchers. However, the other guidelines 
should still apply. When assessing productivity and visibility, promotion committees should 
acknowledge that publishing replication research is hard. (Changing this situation will require 
additional interventions in the publication system, as I discuss later.) Confirmation researchers 
and their institutions should establish agreements to develop coherent research programs, and 
success in these endeavors should be an additional criterion for making tenure and promotion 
decisions. 
Assessing confirmation researchers’ performance will require assessing the quality of their work. 
I propose that high-quality confirmation work focuses on target findings whose status is highly 
informative for the community. Such findings have some (or all) of the following characteristics: 
They have not been well tested already (e.g., the effect has wide confidence intervals, the 
experiment had low statistical power, the experiment was not adequately controlled, and 
replications have not been attempted before), they have been influential in the literature, or they 
have societal relevance. (I return to this point when I discuss professional societies later in this 
section.) It will be important that confirmation outcomes (i.e., positive or negative) not be used as 
a metric to assess confirmation researchers’ performance. Doing so would harm outcome 
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independence, as it would incentivize confirmation researchers to work on well-tested effects, 
which would allow them to produce consistent results (i.e., consistently confirmed or 
disconfirmed). 
A related precedent is that an increasing number of postings of job openings have open-science 
requirements (i.e., in their job applications, candidates must explain how they address the 
replicability and reproducibility of their research). A next step would be to strengthen these 
requirements by asking candidates to provide a replicability and reproducibility agenda for a 
subarea of research more broadly conceived, which could lead to the hybrid-track model 
mentioned earlier. Also, some departments are increasingly incorporating quality metrics (as 
opposed to raw publication numbers) in their appointment and tenure-track criteria. These metrics 
include, for example, the number of studies with high a priori power, the number of preregistered 
studies, and the number of studies with open data and materials (see Schönbrodt, Heene, Maier, 
& Zehetleitner, 2015, for an example). At an institutional level, some universities have initiated 
efforts to implement university-wide research-quality requirements (e.g., see Dijstelbloem, 
Huisman, Miedema, & Mijnhardt, 2013). 
3.2. Governmental and private funders 
3.2.1. Allocate steady funding for confirmation research. 
To make confirmation-research positions sustainable, the most important intervention would be 
to allocate funding directly and steadily to confirmation research. This intervention is the 
responsibility of funding agencies. Only in this way would it be possible to organize all the other 
stakeholders to maintain a system in which confirmation labor is a career option. 
Funding agencies have started allocating resources to replication projects. In 2013, the Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation designated $1.3 million for replication studies on cancer biology 
findings (“Reproducibility Initiative,” 2013). A few years later, the John Templeton Foundation 
funded a project to conduct independent preregistered replications of experimental studies on 
religion (John Templeton Foundation, 2017). 
These fund-allocation precedents are steps toward the professional scheme. However, funding 
agencies should take further action. A project, by definition, has an end. In this sense, replication 
work should be seen not as a project, but as standard practice that does not end. To make 
replication work standard and ensure sustainability, part of the budget that funding agencies 
allocate to research every year should be reallocated consistently every year to fund replication 
efforts. A precedent along these lines has been set by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific 
Research, which in 2016 launched a 3-year pilot program with €3 million to fund replication 
research (Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, 2016). 
Future work should study epistemic trade-offs of different funding-allocation procedures. For 
instance, keeping resources constant, there is most likely a trade-off between increasing the 
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accuracy of estimation of already-reported effects and the discovery of new effects. A 
quantitative understanding of such a trade-off could inform allocation decisions. 
3.2.2. Require multisite work for confirmation projects. 
Funding agencies should not only support replication work but also require researchers applying 
for replication and confirmation grants to do multilab work. (Grant review committees could 
even recommend potential collaborators.) This intervention would enforce the systematicity 
criterion. Additionally, although this intervention is not meant primarily to increase statistical 
power, such an increase would be a welcome by-product. For projects that require hard-to-collect 
data (e.g., studies with clinical and forensic populations), grant schemes that support multisite 
work would be particularly useful. 
Multisite systematic replication is not yet a guideline for funding research in the social sciences. 
However, precedents in other fields show how it could be. If clinical-trial phases are considered 
to be replication attempts, then systematic replication is already quite common in medical 
research. Also, some medical subfields have funding opportunities for projects that incorporate 
multisite recruitment. For instance, the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute announced such 
opportunities for clinical-trial applications (National Institutes of Health, Office of Extramural 
Research, 2018a). 
3.2.3. Standardize guidelines for evaluating confirmation-research proposals. 
Funding agencies that want to fund confirmation research face two questions: What laboratories 
and researchers should be funded? And what kind of projects, areas, and target findings should be 
funded? Regarding the first question, three guidelines are essential. First, proposals should be 
methodologically sound. Not all replication experiments are created equal, and the literature on 
replication has provided insights into what constitutes high-quality replication research. For 
example, high-powered experiments and detailed reporting are elements of good-quality 
replication work (Brandt et al., 2014). Second, the laboratory needs to meet technical 
infrastructure requirements (e.g., proposals for developmental psychology studies with infants 
need facilities that are adequate for infants). Third, the researcher needs to be experienced and to 
be familiar with the area of study, but this familiarity must not compromise the outcome-
independence criterion. In practical terms, this means that replication and original authors should 
not overlap, and preferably they should not be connected by affiliation or academic genealogy. 
Regarding the question of what projects to fund, funding agencies should collaborate with the 
open-science community and professional societies to identify studies that the community 
regards as worth confirming (see the discussion of interventions by professional societies). 
A related precedent in biomedical research is the “rigor and reproducibility” guidance in the 
grant-application guidelines of the National Institutes of Health (National Institutes of Health, 
Office of Extramural Research, 2018b). One requirement in this guidance is that the applicant 
should evaluate the “scientific premise” (i.e., the strengths and weaknesses) of previous research. 
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Although this requirement (by default) concerns grant applications for novel research, it could be 
tailored to apply to confirmation research. 
3.3. Journals and editors 
3.3.1. Publish multisite Registered Reports. 
The interventions by universities and funding agencies address the career incentives problem for 
confirmation researchers. But making multisite replication work sustainable also requires solving 
the venue problem, which requires the intervention of journals and editors. The key intervention 
here is opening the door to the publication of multisite Registered Reports and negative results, to 
give visibility to confirmation researchers’ work. 
As mentioned earlier, some prestigious journals have begun accepting articles reporting 
replication studies and negative results. One precedent that also supports the systematicity 
criterion is this journal’s Registered Replication Reports model, which involves multilab work. 
Still, as of early 2017, only 3% of journals stated that they publish replication research (Martin & 
Clarke, 2017). 
3.3.2. Publish reproducibility reports. 
In addition to replication, reproduction is important to confirmation. To encourage such work and 
reward confirmation researchers further, journals should also publish reproducibility reports: 
short-form peer-reviewed notes presenting the results of running alternative models on the 
original data, alternative data interpretations, verifications of code, and so on. These reports 
would be highly beneficial for most subfields, but especially subfields that rely heavily on 
secondary data analysis. They would also incentivize making maximum use of hard-to-acquire 
data in, for example, developmental and clinical projects. 
Scientists are increasingly interested in performing and consulting reproducibility analyses. 
Although most of the discussion about the current crisis of confidence has focused on replication, 
reproduction in many instances is sufficient to disconfirm findings, and it can do so efficiently. If 
an effect is not robust under an alternative data analysis on the same data set, or if the original 
publication has errors in reported statistics, it would be highly inefficient to conduct a replication 
experiment. Nowadays, reports on reproducibility work are for the most part published in blogs. 
However, journals should both reward high-quality reproducibility work and facilitate it by 
discouraging original experimenters from managing their data privately. Additionally, if journals 
link reproducibility reports to the corresponding original publications, then consumers of original 
articles could access relevant information, and there would be an open record of the evolution of 
discussions. 
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3.4. Professional societies 
3.4.1. Identify what is worth replicating in each subfield. 
In the real world, we cannot estimate every effect size accurately or test every hypothesis. 
Professional societies should help all the other stakeholders to identify studies that require 
replication and to assign priority given epistemic and practical payoffs. Here are three general 
guidelines. First, findings that have already been the target of replication research should receive 
less weight than other findings (e.g., at this point, we probably do not need more direct 
replications of classic anchoring effects). Second, findings that have few outcome-independent 
replications but have inspired a large number of studies should receive more weight than well-
replicated and less influential studies, in order to identify potentially misleading bodies of 
literature. Third, findings that inform (or could inform) evidence-based decisions and treatments 
(e.g., in clinical and forensic psychology) may require closer scrutiny. Professional societies 
could collaborate with practitioners to identify such findings. 
Identifying replication targets also constitutes a good opportunity for crowdsourced science. 
Some initiatives already help the community keep track of confirmation and disconfirmation of 
findings (e.g., curatescience.org). Also, predictive markets can be used to obtain implicit 
knowledge from the community about what needs to be replicated (Dreber et al., 2015). 
3.4.2. Define subfield-specific confirmation guidelines. 
As mentioned before, proposals to increase replicability do not apply automatically to all research 
domains (Tackett et al., 2017). In particular, there is need to adapt the general open-science and 
good-practices recommendations to different subfields. This intervention is necessary regardless 
of the self-corrective scheme implemented. However, in the professional scheme, this 
intervention would help universities and departments to formulate subfield-specific professional 
profiles (i.e., sets of required knowledge and skills) for confirmation researchers. 
Although most publications about increasing replicability have focused on social and cognitive 
psychology, some authors have already characterized challenges and proposed guidelines in other 
subfields. Here are two examples. First, consider the generic advice to “get more participants” to 
increase statistical power. Even though it is sensible, this advice needs to be tailored for specific 
subfields because sampling procedures can vary significantly from one subfield to another. For 
instance, in forensic and clinical psychology, projects involving populations with low base rates 
(e.g., inmates or patients with rare mental conditions) have serious limitations. Specific 
guidelines to increase power in such contexts may include measurement harmonization and 
cross-site collaboration to pool data (Tackett et al., 2017). Second, the advice to “directly 
replicate your own work” might not be constructive in the case of longitudinal studies in 
developmental psychology that take decades. Instead, a more realistic and useful way to increase 
replicability is to conduct within-study robustness checks, for example, using multiple estimation 
techniques and secondary data analysis (Duncan, Engel, Claessens, & Dowsett, 2014). 
  
 26 
3.5. Further implementation worries 
Before concluding, I discuss some potential remaining concerns about implementing the 
professional scheme. 
3.5.1. Who would like to do only “uninteresting” replication work? 
We may worry about whether part of the scientific community would want to do only 
confirmation research. This is a legitimate concern given that many scientists still deem 
replication as uninteresting work for “second stringers.” (To be fair, however, different subfields 
in psychology differ in their assessments of the relative value of novel and confirmatory research. 
For instance, cross-cultural psychology puts confirmation at the forefront given its fundamental 
interest in population generalizability.) But the categories of “interesting research” and 
“epistemically valuable research” often do not overlap. Indeed, the more science progresses, the 
harder it might be to find their intersection. If we cannot find it, we cannot let ourselves be 
carried away by our appetite for interesting stories and expect an invisible hand to clean up the 
mess. 
From a practical perspective, however, what counts as interesting largely depends on the 
incentives. Although the thrill of finding something new motivates many scientists, it would be 
incorrect to think that such a thrill is necessary to motivate them. Many scientists enjoy 
conducting complex experiments more than developing theoretical innovations. Additionally, 
academic research is increasingly competitive. Hence, if a job in confirmation research were a 
career option, it seems that some highly qualified Ph.D. students and postdoctoral researchers 
would want to do this kind of research. 
Finally, consider that society in many contexts relies on workers who do “uninteresting” work 
that we value. Software testers and food-safety auditors are examples of such workers. Because 
society acknowledges the importance of their jobs, there are institutions in place to reward them. 
Confirmation work in science should not be different. The more you think that confirmation 
efforts are necessary but uninteresting, the more you should agree that we should create an 
independent system that rewards them. 
3.5.2. Would the professional scheme create scientific classism? 
One could also worry that separating positions for novel and confirmation research could create 
classism, putting confirmation researchers in a lower and unappreciated tier. (Think of the 
worrisome U.S. adjunct faculty system, in which teachers at many institutions are underpaid and 
overworked relative to permanent faculty.) This is a serious concern given that many researchers 
(at least in psychology) have not fully acknowledged the importance of replication. The key to 
preventing such classism is to conceive novel and confirmation research as different in kind but 
not in value. In practice, this means that universities should design confirmation-research 
positions taking into account at least two preventive guidelines. First, confirmation-research 
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tracks should offer the same career-development paths that are available to discovery researchers 
(e.g., tenure and permanent contracts). Second, universities should not create salary and 
compensation hierarchies that put confirmation researchers below discovery researchers. 
3.5.3. Would the professional scheme affect the incentives for novel research negatively? 
Assume that you are doing novel research and you worry about being publicly questioned by 
independent confirmation researchers. This situation incentivizes two opposed strategies. First, 
you might want to make your research methodology easily replicable so that independent 
replications would likely succeed. This would be generally good. You might also decide to play it 
safe and pursue less creative and less risky (and arguably more replicable) projects than you 
otherwise might. This possibility, which could seem worrisome at first glance, is not necessarily 
bad. Indeed, it would be better for the community to rely on modest replicable findings than on 
creative nonreplicable findings. 
The second strategy would be to make your designs extremely complex so that no confirmation 
researcher would choose to replicate them. This is certainly unwanted. Nonetheless, this strategy 
would yield only a small payoff in the professional scheme, as you would not contribute to the 
replication culture. Highly creative research that facilitates replication attempts (e.g., protocols 
are explicit and materials are shared openly) would be acknowledged the most and therefore 
incentivized. Producing extremely complex research to steer confirmation researchers away 
would ultimately harm you. 
Finally, these possible strategies rely on the assumption that producers of original research worry 
about being questioned. However, if independent confirmatory practices become the norm, they 
will reveal that replication failure should be routinely expected. Hence, scientists would not 
perceive the possibility that other researchers will fail to replicate their findings as negatively as 
they do today. 
3.5.4. Would the professional scheme slow down scientific progress? 
Implementing the professional scheme would require allocating part of the research budget 
consistently and exclusively to confirmatory research. This change, of course, would not come 
without cost: The budget that the current system allocates to high-risk exploratory research would 
be cut. And given this cut, one might worry that scientific progress would slow down. But this 
worry arises from a mistaken assessment of our current rate of progress. Scientific progress 
requires reliance on trustworthy findings (i.e., findings that we are willing to accept with a 
tolerable level of risk). But given the studies suggesting that, in many fields, many results are not 
replicated, we can reasonably doubt that the current published record is in general trustworthy. 
Hence, reliance on dubious results could be leading us to misleading bodies of literature and 
illusory progress. (And this is not merely a theoretical possibility arising from skepticism.) Under 
the professional scheme, science might seem slower, but it would be safer. 
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3.5.5. Would the professional scheme be cost-efficient? 
An objector could worry that the professional scheme may not be a cost-efficient way of 
addressing the current issues regarding self-correction in science. I have three responses. First, if 
we trust the low estimates of published findings’ rate of replicability (e.g., Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015), then we have to acknowledge that the status quo is very inefficient: A 
majority of resources are wasted on findings that turn out to be nonreplicable and uninformative. 
Hence, we need to invest resources in interventions to reverse this situation. 
Second, the professional scheme does not necessarily require large amounts of resources. 
Relative to discovery researchers, confirmation researchers should be a small group in the 
scientific community. We do not need to devote (and we should not devote) resources to confirm 
all findings; rather, we should apply resources so as to maximize information gain for the 
community. Additionally, the number of scientists who acknowledge the importance of 
improving their experimental practices (e.g., by not p-hacking) is increasing. Hence, looking 
forward, the work of discovery researchers should be less prone to error. Thus, the number of 
confirmation researchers needed to keep errors to a reasonable rate should be comparatively 
small, and most resources would still be invested in novel research. 
Third, although other schemes are less resource intensive than the professional scheme, without 
further adjustments, they are not clearly more cost-efficient, as they have shortcomings meeting 
the three evaluation criteria. Adjusting those schemes to better meet the criteria would very likely 
involve incorporating interventions to create distinct rewards for confirmation work; such 
interventions would be costly and also pretty much in line with the professional scheme. The 
strongest case can be made for such an adjusted version of the multisite scheme, which would 
resemble the version of the professional scheme with hybrid novel-research/confirmation-
research positions. 
A more precise economic evaluation of the professional scheme would require quantitative 
analysis. This analysis could be done via agent-based simulations to explore cost-benefit trade-
offs. For instance, under several assumptions about distributions of agent types (e.g., discovery 
researchers, replication researchers) and experiment costs (e.g., sample sizes), one could explore 
how to achieve a specific epistemic goal, such as increasing the replicability rate from 39% 
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015) to 60% efficiently. I leave this analysis for future work. 
3.5.6. Would the professional scheme hinder theory development? 
Theory development requires feedback between novel research and confirmation efforts. And one 
could worry that separating discovery and confirmation researchers could lead each group to 
produce research that is inconsequential to the other (e.g., confirmation researchers may produce 
highly reliable research that does not inform new theories, and discovery researchers may 
produce very innovative but hard-to-confirm theories). However, it is worth noticing that in the 
professional scheme, researchers doing novel work would still be expected to produce reliable 
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work to the extent that they can. On the other hand, the intervention of professional societies is 
key. Regardless of the scheme, professional societies should help their members to keep track of 
the confirmation status of theories and should produce continuous recommendations about what 
is important to confirm. This would help confirmation researchers to focus on useful replication 
efforts. 
3.5.7. Given that novel research is increasingly incentivized to be reliable, will the 
professional scheme cease to be necessary? 
These days, the work of confirmation researchers is perhaps more necessary than it has ever been. 
At the same time, it is also true that most scientists are changing their practices and have higher 
incentives to produce replicable research. Hence, one could speculate that if the professional 
scheme were implemented now, confirmation researchers down the road might have less work to 
do as a result of most novel research becoming reliable. In such a scenario, the professional 
scheme might no longer be necessary. On the contrary, however, even in the best-case scenario 
(i.e., that the current crisis will lead to sustainable changes on the side of discovery researchers), 
there will always be a need for independent and systematic confirmation efforts: Eliminating 
researcher degrees of freedom entirely is impossible, so there will always be the possibility of 
mistakes and bias that will need to be corrected. Independent and systematic confirmation efforts 
should be adopted as standard practice. 
Conclusion 
Perhaps for scientists in the future it will be evident that any thriving scientific community 
requires a dedicated group of researchers to keep the community’s errors in check. Today the 
need for such a group is not evident. In this article, I have proposed supporting such a group as 
part of a self-corrective-labor scheme. The argument consisted of three steps. First, I argued that 
replication labor (and confirmation efforts more broadly) should satisfy three criteria, namely, 
systematicity, outcome independence, and sustainability. Second, I used these criteria to evaluate 
four prominent self-corrective-labor schemes and argued that they all fall short. And third, I 
argued that the key to overcoming their limitations is a particular division of cognitive labor: A 
scheme that separates researchers (and their rewards systems) so that some do primarily novel 
research and others do confirmatory research satisfies the criteria better than schemes lacking this 
division. To approach this theoretical ideal, I have proposed creating and sustaining 
confirmation-research-track positions by aligning interventions at the levels of different 
stakeholders (from funding agencies to journals). Researchers in these positions would be able to 
conduct replication work that the community needs without the conflicting pressures of our 
current novelty-based reward system. Although these interventions might seem taxing and 
detrimental to novel research, they would make scientific progress safer and more certain. 
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Notes 
1. Consider some examples. As Yong (2012) documented, when facing the failed attempts to 
replicate his elderly-priming effect, John Bargh wrote in a now-deleted blog post that the 
replication researchers (Doyen et al., 2012) were “incompetent or ill-informed” and that there 
was “nothing in their heads” (Yong, 2012, para. 22). A similar situation occurred after the work 
of Schnall, Benton, and Harvey (2008), which defended a link between cleanliness primes and 
moral judgments, was called into question by Johnson, Cheung, and Donnellan (2013). As 
documented by Meyer and Chabris (2014), advocates of Schnall et al.’s work called the 
replication researchers “shameless little bullies” and “self-righteous, self-appointed sheriffs” 
(para. 8; about this case, see also Bohannon, 2014). Another similar controversy concerned the 
power-pose effect (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010) and a large-sample failure to replicate it 
(Ranehill et al., 2015; see Aschwanden, 2016, for discussion). Interestingly, Fetterman and 
Sassenberg (2015) suggested that researchers overestimate the extent to which failed replications 
damage original researchers’ reputations. 
2. Assuming equal sample sizes, an original experiment and a replication experiment will yield 
confidence intervals of approximately the same size. The difference is negligible given that the 
width of a confidence interval is primarily dependent on the sample size. 
3. A multistudy article presents a series of experiments (mostly conceptual replications) 
purported to confirm the same general hypothesis. One fundamental problem with these 
publications is that many of them report only those attempted conceptual replications that yielded 
statistically significant results, which introduces biases, even in the absence of p-hacking.  
4. Everett and Earp (2015) suggested a venue such as PLOS ONE, which publishes studies 
regardless of novelty and bases acceptance primarily on whether experiments were well 
conducted. 
5. In other fields, multisite collaboration for replication has become common (e.g., consortia that 
conduct genomewide-association studies) as a result of editorial enforcement and increasingly 
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large sample-size requirements intended to ensure that studies are well powered (Kraft et al., 
2009). 
6. Historians of science regard Bacon’s ideas as a major influence in the rise of institutions (e.g., 
the Royal Society of London) to organize and promote scientific work in the mid-1600s. 
However, there is a difference in emphasis in how modern science divides cognitive labor and 
how Bacon conceived his utopia. From an institutional perspective, division of labor in modern 
science occurs more between fields than between different steps in a project. 
7. In philosophy of science, the distinction has been introduced to discuss scientific research that 
is not strictly driven by specific hypotheses or theories (Steinle, 1997). In recent discussions in 
psychology, the distinction has been used to stress the importance of producing replicable 
research (Baumeister, 2016; Sakaluk, 2016). In practice, however, the distinction is overlooked 
by many scientists, as they often report exploratory research as confirmatory.  
8. For example, in 2017, the Religious Replication Project at the University of Amsterdam 
advertised a position for a Ph.D. student that involved “1. conducting a pre-registered replication 
study; 2. setting up multi-lab pre-registered replication studies and 3. seeking adversarial 
collaboration with the original authors of theoretically disputed effects within the field of the 
psychology of religion” (“PhD Position in Psychology of Religion,” 2017, para. 2). A similar 
position also advertised in 2017, at KU Leuven, required research on “robustness and 
reproducibility of the results of existing data analysis” and “performing replication studies” 
(“Assistant Research & Education,” 2017, para. 2). 
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